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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tyson E. Madden appeals from his judgment of conviction for eluding a
police officer and DUI. Specifically, Madden claims the district court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss the eluding charge.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinas
Madden stole a pickup truck after he had been drinking with friends at a
mobile home in Coeur d'Alene, ldaho. (R., p.68.) ldaho State Trooper Michael
Lininger observed the pickup driven by Madden without its headlights on. (R.,
p.5.) The trooper attempted to stop the truck by activating his emergency lights
and siren. (R., p.5.) Madden eluded the officer by driving off the left shoulder of
the roadway, swerving sideways, and accelerating rapidly onto a different road.
(R., p.5.) A pursuit ensued with Madden traveling in excess of 100 mph. (R.,
p.5.) Madden eventually got on Interstate 90 and drove west into Washington.

(R., p.5.)

Madden exited the interstate on Liberty Drive in Liberty Lake

Washington. (R., p.5.)
The Liberty Lake Police Department was notified and asked to "take over
the pursuit." (R., p.66.) Officer Thomas responded to the request and joined in
the pursuit along with ldaho law enforcement. (R., p.66.) Washington and ldaho
law enforcement followed Madden until he crashed the stolen truck into a parked
vehicle.

(R., p.67.)

Washington law enforcement arrested Madden and

transported him to the hospital where he received treatment for the injuries he
sustained in the crash. (R., pp.67-68.) Madden waived his rights to an attorney

and admitted he stole the vehicle, was highly intoxicated, and that he consumed
a half gallon of liquor and six 12 oz. bottles of beer that evening. (R., pp.5; 68.)
In Washington, Madden was charged with possession of stolen property
and attempting to elude an officer. (R., pp.72-90.) The charge of attempted
eluding alleged Madden, "in the state of Washington . . . did willfully fail and
refuse to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and did drive his vehicle in a
reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle after being
given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop by a uniformed law
enforcement officer with the Liberty Lake Police Department . . . ." (R., pp.7273.) In Idaho, Madden was also charged with eluding based on the allegation
that Madden on "U.S. Highway 95 near Appelway Avenue, Coeur d'Alene, ldaho

. . . willfully eluded andlor attempted to elude a pursuing police vehicle after
being given a visual signal and/or audible signal to stop . . . ." (R., p.41.)
Madden pleaded guilty to the Washington charges. After entering his
pleas, Madden filed a motion to dismiss the ldaho grand theft and attempted
eluding charges on the basis that he had already been prosecuted and pleaded
guilty to those crimes in Washington. (R., p.54.) Madden argued that because
the "acts charged [in ldaho] as public offenses in this case, grand theft and felony
eluding were within the venue of the state of Washington as well as [in Idahoj",
his pleas and judgment of conviction for those crimes in Washington "should
accordingly bar the prosecution therefore in this jurisdiction . . . pursuant to I.C. §
19-315." (R., pp.63-64.) The district court granted the motion with regard to the
grand theft charge but denied Madden's claim regarding the eluding charge.

(12/07/06 Tr., p.16, Ls.17-24.) The court distinguished between the two charges
reasoning as follows:
Under [I.C. 31 18-2403 the crime of grand theft is committed
when a person steals property -- it says a person steals property
and commits theft when, with the intent to deprive another of liberty
or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds that property. So basically
the singular crime of grand theft can be committed in any number of
those three ways, that is, to take the property, to obtain it or to
simply withhold it.
He's charged in the state of Washington and stands
convicted of basically obtaining or withholding such stolen property.
In the state of Idaho he's simply charged with actually having taken
the property. It's essentially the same offense that has occurred
and simply the venue is persuasive in both jurisdictions. And so I
think that clearly an application of the statutory bar is applicable to
count 2, that is the crime of grand theft.
Essentially the state is correct that such a crime could be
prosecuted in either jurisdiction, but essentially we are dealing with
the same event. He takes a car, he's deprived a singular owner of
their property with the intent to wrongfully withhold and hold that
property. The state of Wshington [sic] can conveniently charge him
with being in possession of that property with the same requisite
elements. However, its essentially the same crime of grand theft.
It's just simply probable [sic] easier in the state of Washington and
has resulted in a conviction. And so I would agree that a Motion to
Dismiss is appropriate with respect to count 2 and I am inclined to
adopt the holding in the Comingore case. The Comingore case, I
think, dealt strictly with a theft related offense as in count 2 in this
case. Did not really deal with the eluding allegation.
The difficulty with the eluding allegation is is that you have
behavior that can occur separately and distinctly in each state.
Now the state of Washington apparently holds violation of the
felony in the state of Washingotn [sic] by running from law
enforcement in the state of Washington in a reckless manner,
which is similar to our statute. But the behavior is separate,
independent and distinct in this court's estimation. When he stole
the car and had possession of the car, nothing changed when he
crossed state lines. He had one singular crime that could be
prosecuted essentially in either state. But there was nothing that

required him to continue running from law enforcement in a
reckless fashion in the state of Washington.
And so there is a distinct act in the state of Washington
where motoring members of the public were jeopardized by his
reckless conduct in that particular state. And by not adhering to the
directives of law enforcement in that particular state that, I think, is
a distinct and separate offense from his behavior on the roadways
here in the state of ldaho where he would have had to likewise
driven recklessly here in the state of ldaho. Had he simply driven
recklessly here in the state of ldaho, crossed state lines and then
driven slowly and calmly and still not pulled over for law
enforcement, it would be two separate and distinct crimes as well.
But I think there's a real distinction between the two offenses
that are in front of the court. And I don't feel satisfied that the
provisions of 19-315 are applicable to count 1.
(12/07/06 Tr., p.14, L . l l

-

p.16, L.20.) Accordingly, the district court granted

Madden's motion with regard to the grand theft charge and denied Madden's
motion to dismiss the eluding charge. (12/07/06 Tr., p.16, Ls.17-24.)
Madden entered a conditional guilty plea in which he preserved the right to
appeal from this ruling (R., p.107) and timely appealed (R., pp.126-29).

ISSUE
Madden states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Madden's motion to dismiss
the eluding charge where Mr. Madden had already pleaded guilty to
eluding in Washington in a case involving the same conduct that is
at issue in this case?
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court correctly rule that I.C. 5 19-315 does not bar the prosecution
of Madden for eluding an ldaho law enforcement officer while in Idaho, an act
over which Washington never had jurisdiction because the Washington charge
involved a separate and distinct criminal act?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctlv Determined That I.C. G $9-315 Does Not Prohibit
Madden's Prosecution For Eluding An Officer In ldaho
A.

Introduction
Madden claims the district court erred when it determined that I.C. § 19-

315 did not bar his prosecution in ldaho for eluding an ldaho police officer in
ldaho where Madden was also charged with attempting to elude a Washington
law enforcement officer in Washington. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-5.) Pursuant to
the plain language of I.C. § 19-315, the state is only precluded from prosecuting
a criminal act that occurs within the venue of two states if the defendant has
been convicted or acquitted of that criminal act in the other jurisdiction. Here,
where the district court found there were two separate criminal acts -- two
instances of eluding occurring at two different times in two different states -- I.C.

3 19-315 does not bar Madden's prosecution for eluding in both states
B.

Standard of Review
Questions of statutory interpretation and application are given free review.

State v. Maidwell, 137 ldaho 424, 426, 50 P.3d 439,441 (2002).
C.

Under The Plain Lanauaae Of I.C. G 19-315, Madden's Prior Conviction
For Attemptinq To Elude A Washington Police Officer In Washinston Does
Not Bar His ldaho Prosecution For Eludina A Police Officer In ldaho
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted

according to its plain language, and that where the language is plain the court will
not resort to principles of statutory construction. State Dep't of Health and
Welfare v. Housel, 140 ldaho 96, 103, 90 P.3d 321, 328 (2004); State v.

Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). As explained in State v.
Wiedmeier, 121 ldaho 189, 191, 824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted):
"When a statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in accordance with its
language, courts must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing court may not apply
rules of construction." in addition, the words in a statute should be given their
ordinary meaning. State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721
(2003). Thus, here, where the language is clear and unambiguous, this Court
must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute's language.'
The statute at issue reads:
19-315. Conviction or acquittal in another state. -When an act
charged as a public offense, is within the venue of another state,
territory, or country, as well as of this state, a conviction or acquittal
thereof in the former is a bar to the prosecution or indictment
therefore in this state.
Per the plain meaning of I.C. 3 19-315, Madden must show the "act" for which he
was charged -- eluding a law enforcement officer in ldaho -- is also an act that
was committed "within the venue of another state" and that he was convicted or
acquitted of that act in that state. I.C.

3

19-315. Madden has not met this

burden. Washington had no authority to charge Madden for his eluding conduct
in ldaho. Similarly, ldaho had no authority to charge Madden for his eluding
conduct that occurred in Washington and that formed the basis for the

' To the extent Madden claims the statute is unclear or ambiguous, Madden's

claim is without merit. Madden has not identified any portion of the statute that
he claims is confusing or unclear. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) Further, a review
of the statute shows that there is nothing in the statute that is reasonably subject
to conflicting interpretations. See Terteling v. Pavne, 131 ldaho 389, 392, 957
P.2d 1387, 1390 (1998).

Washington charge. Indeed, in Washington, Madden was solely charged with
the crime of eluding a "uniformed law enforcement officer with the Liberty Lake
Police Department" that took place "in the State of Washington." (R., pp.72-73.)
Similarly, in ldaho, Madden was solely charged with conduct that occurred in
ldaho

--

that Madden on "US. Highway 95 near Appleway Avenue, Coeur

dlAlene, ldaho . . . willfully eluded andlor attempted to elude a pursuing police
vehicle after being given a visual signal and/or audible signal to stop . . . ." (R.,
p.41.) A review of these charging documents shows two distinct public offenses,
two different criminal acts, occurring in two different venues.
Moreover, as illustrated by the charging documents, there is no overlap of
any of the elements of these two separate and distinct crimes. Consequently,
where there are two different public offenses, and no overlap of any elements of
those crimes or victims, there is not a situation where two jurisdictions share
prosecutorial authority. Therefore, because Washington did not have jurisdiction
over the public offense charged in ldaho
ldaho

--

--

eluding an ldaho police officer in

I.C. s19-315 by its own terms is inapplicable and Madden's claim is

without merit.
Madden's reliance on Cook v. State, 145, ldaho 482, 180 P.3d 521 (Ct.
App. 2008), for a contrary result is misplaced. In

Cook,

the ldaho Court of

Appeals recognized that for a defendant "to succeed on his I.C. §19-315 claim,
[the defendant] would have to show that he had already been either acquitted or
convicted of the acts leading to the ldaho charges in a previous criminal
proceeding."

Id- at

491, 180 P.3d at 530. In

Cook, the defendant set up a

fraudulent securities scheme and obtained money from victims in ldaho, Utah,
and Wyoming by representing that he was licensed and investing their money in
sound investments.

Id.at 524.

In reality, the defendant was investing only some

of the money in a risky venture and funneling the rest into his personal accounts
or back to other investors to effectuate a "Ponzi-like scheme."

Id. The defendant

was convicted and sentenced in both Utah and Wyoming courts before pleading
guilty in ldaho.

Id.

In post-conviction proceedings, the defendant alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel claiming his attorney should have moved to
dismiss pursuant to I.C. 319-315.

Id.at 525.

The Court of Appeals rejected the

claim concluding there was no basis for such a motion because the defendant
was "indicted [and convicted in Wyoming and Utah] solely for his actions
occurring in Utah and Wyoming and in regard to Wyoming residents."

Id.at 530.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that because the charges in Utah
and Wyoming related to his "illegal activities as a whole" and mentioned some of
his activities in ldaho, that his guilty pleas in those states also covered his actions
in ldaho.

Id. Accordingly, the ldaho Court of Appeals concluded there was no

deficient performance because there was no basis to dismiss pursuant to I.C.
319-315.

Id.at 531.

Here, just as in

Cook, Madden claims that because the crimes he

committed were part of a continuous course of conduct, I.C. 319-315 controls.
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) As set out by Cook, however, the test is not whether the
criminal act charged was part of general scheme or criminal escapade, but rather
whether two jurisdictions have authority over one crime. Here, a review of the

charging documents in Washington and ldaho incontrovertibly show there were
two separate crimes with different facts and different venues with no overlapping
elements. Furthermore, the plain language of I.C.
prosecution based on a "course of conduct."

5 19-315 does not foreclose

Indeed, there is nothing in the

language of I.C. § 19-315 that mentions "course of conduct." Section 19-315 is
triggered not by a "course of conduct" but when a single criminal "act" is within
the venue of two states and where the defendant has been convicted or
acquitted with regard to that particular criminal act. Here, there are two distinct
criminal acts that occurred in separate states.
Consequently, here, just as in Cook, the out-of-state conviction did not
cover the criminal acts that occurred in ldaho and I.C. § 19-315 does not apply.
As such, the district court correctly rejected Madden's claim that his ldaho
eluding charge should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Madden's motion to dismiss the ldaho eluding charge.
DATED this 19th day of November 2008.
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